Engaging in Good Faith: Ethics, Archives, and Critical Constitutionalisms by Pether, Penelope
Volume 57 Issue 1 Article 3 
2012 
Engaging in Good Faith: Ethics, Archives, and Critical 
Constitutionalisms 
Penelope Pether 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Penelope Pether, Engaging in Good Faith: Ethics, Archives, and Critical Constitutionalisms, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 
79 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 1  9-MAY-12 15:17
2012]
ENGAGING IN GOOD FAITH: ETHICS, ARCHIVES, AND CRITICAL
CONSTITUTIONALISMS—AN INVITED RESPONSE TO SAMUEL W.
CALHOUN, STOPPING PHILADELPHIA ABORTION PROVIDER KERMIT
GOSNELL AND PREVENTING OTHERS LIKE HIM: AN OUTCOME THAT
BOTH PRO-CHOICERS AND PRO-LIFERS SHOULD SUPPORT
PENELOPE PETHER*
“‘It’s not that the [Roe] judgment was wrong, but it moved too far too
fast,’ Ginsburg told a symposium at Columbia Law School marking the
40th anniversary of her joining the faculty as its first tenure-track female
professor. . . .  ‘The court made a decision that made every abortion law
in the country invalid, even the most liberal,’ Ginsburg said.  ‘We’ll
never know whether I’m right or wrong . . . things might have turned
out differently if the court had been more restrained.’”1
I. A CULTURE OF OPPOSITION
LIKE Professor Calhoun,2 I hold little hope for an end to this distinc-tive national battle in what Australian constitutional law scholars Tony
Blackshield and George Williams, echoing Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Romer v. Evans,3 aptly call our “‘culture war’ over issues of sexuality.”4
Other battles in this war, such as the current litigation in the federal
courts over the constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriage or the con-
troversy of the Obama Administration’s departure from its “science stan-
dard” in refusing the National Institutes of Health’s recommendations
that the “morning after pill” be made available over-the-counter to minors,
presently dot the jurisdiction, just as those named Antietam, Bull Run, and
Gettysburg marked the nation’s territory in their era.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks are due to
Andrew M. Rein, Villanova University School of Law Class of 2012, and Brian J.
Boyle, Villanova University School of Law Class of 2013, for excellent research
assistance; to Dean John Gotanda and Associate Dean Steven M. Chanenson for
research funding and support; and to J.J. Williamson, Editor-in-Chief, Villanova
Law Review, and Professor Samuel W. Calhoun for the invitation to write this
Essay.
1. David Crary, Ginsburg Questions 1973 Abortion Ruling’s Timing, BOSTON.COM,
Feb. 10, 2012, http://articles.boston.com/2012-02-10/news/31047317_1_ginsburg
-abortion-law-wade-case (alteration in original).
2. See Samuel W. Calhoun, Stopping Philadelphia Abortion Provider Kermit Gosnell
and Preventing Others Like Him: An Outcome That Both Pro-choicers and Pro-lifers Should
Support, 57 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (concluding that “[i]t is obvious that the abor-
tion controversy is a passionate dispute that is certain to continue”).
3. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (contending that “[t]he
Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite”).
4. TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& THEORY: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 320 (5th ed. 2010).
(79)
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What both wars have in common is the evidence of what legal histo-
rian Christopher Tomlins has aptly called the “republic’s foundational
commitment to bisectionalism.”5  In his “Great American Novella,” The
Crying of Lot 49, Thomas Pynchon makes the question of bisectionalism—
or, in the language of poststructuralist theory, “binary oppositions” (such
as “pro-life” and “pro-choice”)—an explicitly American one, and identifies
the price we pay for this practice of polarity.  His heroine, Oedipa Maas,
laments the “ones and zeroes,” the binary oppositions that have come to
structure America, and the way they have stifled the potential of what she
labels the “diversity” that America had once promised.6  The teeming mid-
dle grounds have been excluded by commitments to understanding the
world through opposition, dividing it into us and others.
In poststructuralist thought, the zero (the “other” term) is inferior, a
negative through which the dominant “one” defines itself.  In the debate
over legal regulation of abortion in the United States, “pro-life” increas-
ingly occupies the rhetorical space of the “one”; “pro-choice” has assumed
the rhetorical position of the other, “zero.”7  It can only do so, I will go on
to suggest, if our foundational national history—encoded in the 1808 At-
lantic Slave Trade Clause,8 the grounds for the domestic slave-breeding
industry that replaced trafficking via the Middle Passage in its critical role
in constituting the nation—is forgotten.9  This constitutional provision
and what it memorialized and promised branded the nation, apparently
5. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY
IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580-1865, at 522 (2010).
6. THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49, at 181-82 (1966).
7. Gallup records a drop from 56% to 50% of American adults polled agree-
ing that abortions should “sometimes” be legal between 2004 and 2011; it also
showed that the percentage of adults nationwide polled who considered abortion
to be “morally wrong” increased from 45% to 50% between 2001 and 2010, and
the percentage of those who considered it to be “morally acceptable” decreased
from 42% to 38%. See Abortion and Birth Control, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://
pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).  CBS News Poll
showed that in 2010, 62% of adults polled nationwide thought abortions should
not be permitted or should be available under stricter limits. See id.  Fox News/
Opinion Dynamics records an increase from 40% to 50% of registered voters na-
tionally between 1997 and 2001 describing themselves as “pro-life,” and a decrease
from 50% to 42% over the same period in the numbers of those identifying them-
selves as pro-choice. See id.  Gallup’s poll of American adults shows different totals
but a similar (although less marked and consistent) trend in the increase of those
who identify themselves as pro-life: from 2001 to 2011 the number identifying
themselves as pro-choice rose from 47% to 49% and the number identifying them-
selves as pro-life rose from 41% to 45%. See id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting Congress from outlawing importa-
tion of persons until 1808).
9. See, e.g., Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thir-
teenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11, 42
(2001) (proposing “integrated narrative linking slavery with reproductive
oppression”).
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indelibly, with the “politics of hatred”10 that makes fertile ground for a
national imaginary structured by bisectionalism.
I will go on to complicate the apparent moral inferiority of “choice”
as measured against “life” as I excavate the constitutional history of forced
reproduction in this nation at this Essay’s conclusion.  The discursive con-
struction of the moral bankruptcy of choice is clearly signaled by Professor
Calhoun’s reproduction (in what is often a thought-provoking essay) of
this “hypothetical that appears periodically in the abortion debate”:11
“From time to time, for rhetorical purposes, the prom-dress girl
is invoked—a fictional teenager who has suddenly decided she’s
too pregnant for her formal and walks into a clinic at twenty-
eight weeks demanding to have it taken care of.  Nobody has ever
produced an actual prom-dress girl; the point about the prom-
dress girl is theoretical, and in a theoretical way it is true: under
Roe, and under Casey, in the unlikely event that the prom-dress
girl were able to find a suitably cooperative doctor, she too would
theoretically be able to claim a legal right to abortion—a consti-
tutionally protected ‘right to choose.’”12
Professor Calhoun’s response to the tawdriness, the banality of evil that
the hypothetical both depicts and constitutes, is this:
Let this sink in for a moment.  The law in the United States, as it
stands right now, is that a woman who is well into her third tri-
mester or even on the verge of a full-term delivery, can obtain a
legal abortion if she decides she wants to look better in a prom
dress. All she must do is find an abortion provider who is willing to do
the procedure and willing to say it is necessary because of concerns about
her emotional well-being.13
I am a legal scholar with a law degree and a research doctorate in literary
studies.  Words and their power, then, interest me.  Let me make three
brief points about prom-dress girl.  First, dignifying this pure fabrication
with the term “hypothetical” (the term for constructed factual scenarios
used in law school examinations to test students’ knowledge of the law and
their ability to interpret how it would work in the real world) in construct-
ing the paradigmatic seeker of a late-term, legal, “elective” abortion, this
moral vacancy of a young woman, still of school age, who seeks to abort a
viable fetus so she can fit into a fancy frock for a national rite of teenaged
passage, does (its own) rhetorical work.
10. CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE:
SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTA´NAMO BAY 252 (2007).
11. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 38.
12. Id. (quoting Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think
They Have Everything to Lose, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2004, at 40).
13. Id. at 39 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Next, the fabricated prom-dress girl brings to mind the many real sto-
ries of teenagers who give birth—and hide that they do so—in conditions
which frequently coincide with the death of their infant, including the
real-life infanticidal prom girl, Melissa Drexler.  Drexler’s hidden (and ap-
parently externally physically invisible14) pregnancy led to a delivery of
her live infant in a rest room toilet during her high school’s prom, held at
a New Jersey catering facility.  Drexler placed and then tied the baby in a
plastic garbage bag, discarded the child into the trash, and she was subse-
quently charged with aggravated manslaughter, which resulted in a fifteen-
year prison term.15  At sentencing, Drexler’s attorney described her as “an
immature, disoriented and frightened person who was in denial through-
out her pregnancy and during the trip to the prom.”16
There are many other similar stories, for example that of Brian C.
Peterson, Jr. and Amy S. Grossberg, college freshmen “whose son was
found in a trash container outside the Comfort Inn in Newark, Del.,” lead-
ing to their being charged with crimes including capital murder.17  Or,
even closer to home, Drexel University freshman Mia Sardella who, like
Drexler and Grossberg, apparently hid her pregnancy, only to deliver a
son who was “found suffocated in the trunk of a car,” resulting in multiple
charges including first-degree murder.18
All these young, desperate, pregnant women were convicted of vary-
ing offenses related to what courts concluded was infanticide.  The New
York Times reported:
Tracking this crime is difficult, because many corpses are
never discovered.  Using Justice Department statistics, one esti-
mate puts the number at about 250 a year.  Dr. Phillip J. Resnick,
a professor of psychiatry at Case Western Reserve medical school,
who coined the term “neonaticide” in 1970, said that the number
is on the decline because of the availability of birth control and
abortion.
Typically, neonaticides are committed by young, isolated wo-
men in severe denial of their pregnancy.  If they have irregular
menstrual periods, they may not realize that they are pregnant
soon enough to have an abortion.  Doctors say that small, fit wo-
men may not develop a belly; one mother said she had seen her
14. See Abby Goodnough & Bruce Weber, Before Prom Night, a Suspect Was the
Girl Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at B1 (quoting mother of friend who had
gone prom-dress shopping with Drexler several weeks before prom as saying
“‘[s]he was trying on small sizes’”).
15. Id. (relating acts committed by Drexler on prom night); Robert Hanley,
Woman Gets 15 Years in Death of Newborn at Prom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at B1.
16. Hanley, supra note 15, at B1.
17. Jan Hoffman, The Charge Is Murder; An Infant’s Death, an Ancient Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, § 4, at 4.
18. Amy Buckman, Teen Mom Surrenders in Baby Death Case, 6ABC.COM, May 22,
2007, http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=5327923.
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teen-age daughter naked the night before she gave birth and had
not noticed anything remarkable about the girl’s figure.
Profoundly unprepared, the women find themselves giving
birth in department store bathrooms and college dorms.  The
trauma of delivery, followed by the crying of a newborn, crashes
through the thickest walls of denial.  Women try to stifle the wails
by strangling the baby, stuffing tissues down its throat, drowning
it in the toilet.  Then they throw the tiny corpses in trash com-
pactors, leave them in dresser drawers, even toss them out
windows.19
Who are we, then, as a nation which produces real-life prom-dress-girl in-
fanticides and transmutes their stories onto the stock character of the bit-
ter national debate about the legality of abortion, and particularly late-
term abortion?  How did we come to be constituted thus as a people?
History provides part of the answer.  In constitutionalizing (however
obliquely) the question of slavery, Madison had wished to remove it from
the zone of politics, a judgment or a species of wishful constitutional
thinking that the Civil War demonstrated was excessively hopeful.  This
theory is espoused in modern U.S. constitutional thought by Cass Sun-
stein, who advocates constitutionalizing socially divisive issues as a strategy
to
[t]ake . . . [them] off the political agenda . . . as a means not of
disabling but of protecting politics, by reducing the power of
highly controversial questions to create factionalism, instability,
impulsiveness, chaos, stalemate, collective action problems, myo-
pia, strategic behavior, or hostilities so serious and fundamental
as to endanger the governmental process itself.  In this respect,
the decision to use constitutionalism to remove certain issues
from politics is often profoundly democratic.20
If Madison’s judgment about this strategy was flawed, albeit arguably situa-
tionally necessary at the point of constitution-making, his decision loses
much of both its democratic legitimacy and strategic appeal when the con-
stitutionalizer is the Supreme Court.  Both legitimacy and appeal diminish
still further when the Court’s doctrinal vehicle for doing so is as dubious—
because so manifestly politicized—as substantive due process had been in
even its initial iteration.21  That dubiousness and the legitimacy of both
Court and common law constitutional corpus juris deepened as the instabil-
ity of the emerging doctrine in its privacy rights housing became manifest.
19. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 4.
20. Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 642
(1991).
21. This issue led President Roosevelt to “call[ ] for reforms that would en-
sure that the American people had the final say over important constitutional
questions.”  Thomas Donnelly, A Voters’ Veto to Overrule the Courts, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2011, at A17.
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I will return to the question of constitutionalizing the “right” to abor-
tion—as to what the original constitutional compact and the immediate
legal prehistory of Roe might offer in that regard—at the conclusion of this
Essay.
II. CONTEXTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY U.S. ABORTION LAW
Professor Calhoun, long a (relatively lonely) voice among legal aca-
demics in the pro-life camp, makes good on his promise to reach for com-
mon ground with those he sees in the pro-choice one.  At the same time,
he evidences how unlikely it is that common ground will be found in his
or my lifetime with his diagnosis that “[p]ro-lifers in Virginia seem deter-
mined to”22 “seek[ ] excessive [clinic] regulations . . . with the hidden
objective of driving abortion providers out of business,”23 and his conclu-
sion that “[i]f an abortion clinic performs only first-trimester abortions, it
goes too far to impose the enhanced standards applicable to outpatient
surgical facilities.”24  I agree with Professor Calhoun that every lawyer and
every citizen, woman or man, pro-choice or pro-life, and those of us whose
positions on the legality of abortion lie in the complex legal, ethical, and
constitutional territory which that binary excludes, should stand with him
and condemn Kermit Gosnell and his inhumane practices: the butchery
Kermit Gosnell practiced on women on whom he performed abortions,25
22. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 20.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 21.  Recent Pennsylvania legislation has a similar effect, for example
by “hold[ing abortion] clinics to the same safety standards as out-patient surgery
centers—such as requiring wider hallways and doorways, bigger operating rooms,
and full-time nurses”—and subjecting them to “unannounced inspection[s].” See
Marc Levy, New Rules for Pa. Abortion Clinics, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 2011, at B3.
Virginia has subsequently made national news by introducing trans-vaginal ultra-
sounds before abortion, and a fetal life bill, which would effectively outlaw abor-
tion in the state. See Va. House OKs 2 Antiabortion Bills, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 15,
2012, at A10.
25. See Report of the Grand Jury at 96-97, In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury
XXIII, Misc. No. 0009901-2008 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://
www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/GrandJuryWomensMedical.pdf (revealing
that in Gosnell’s early abortion practice he had agreed to use his abortion patients
in unauthorized trial of a “device [fashioned of] plastic razors that were formed
into a ball. . . .  They were coated into a gel, so that they would remain closed.
These would be inserted into the woman’s uterus.  And after several hours of body
temperature, . . . the gel would melt and these things would spring open, suppos-
edly cutting up the fetus, and the fetus would be expelled” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  Gosnell tested the device despite prior testing showing that
when they had been used by their developer on Bangladeshi women raped by
Pakistani soldiers, “[t]hose women suffered a high rate of complications.” Id. at
97.  Gosnell’s “experimental” patients suffered complications including “a punc-
tured uterus, hemorrhage, infections, and retained fetal remains,” and in one case
a hysterectomy was needed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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whether legal or otherwise,26 which led to maternal injury,27 infection,28
and in some cases death;29 Gosnell’s repeated performance of illegal abor-
tions;30 and, most depraved of all, the institutionalizing in his filthy West
Philadelphia charnel house, denominated a clinic, a practice of neonati-
cide at once both casual and callous.31
However, I approach what Kermit Gosnell’s alleged crimes—the fac-
tual bases of which some of his co-accused have admitted as they pled
guilty to charges laid against them32—have to tell us about the way we live
now from a place rather different from that occupied by Professor Cal-
houn.  That different situatedness leads to my registering a number of in-
sights generated by reading against the grain both Professor Calhoun’s
essay and Philadelphia District Attorney Seth Williams’s grand jury report
on what was discovered about Kermit Gosnell’s abortion clinic in the wake
of the death on the premises of one of his patients, Karnamaya Mongar.  I
then pose questions left unasked by essay or report, terminating with this
especially pressing one, What brought Mrs. Mongar to Gosnell’s Women’s
Medical Society, and brings other women to licensed backyard abortionists
like Gosnell?  But as I do so, let me register that the forensically driven
narrative of the grand jury report, setting in chain the pressing and prose-
cution of criminal charges against Gosnell and his wife and staff, leaves
much unanswered as to what brought Gosnell his patient-victims; that is
not its rhetorical job.  Absent access to the messiness of witness testimony
from which the report was constructed, many of the questions of the legal
and literary investigator find no clear answers but only merely suggestive
shadows, illuminated to some degree by contexts.
26. See id. at 26-27 (noting that while Gosnell’s clinic performed first-, second-
, and third-trimester abortions, he increasingly relied on abortions past twenty and
even beyond twenty-four weeks).
27. See id. at 25 (“He perforated bowels, cervixes and uteruses.  He left women
sterile.”).
28. See id. (finding that “[h]e left an arm and a leg of a partially aborted fetus
in the womb of another woman, and then told her he did not need to see her
when she became sick days later, having developed a temperature of 106 de-
grees”); see also id. at 102-03 (describing case of seventeen-year-old girl whose fetus
(of at least thirty-two-weeks development) was delivered through use of abor-
tifacients and then killed by slitting its neck, and who subsequently developed in-
fection that nearly killed her but whose symptoms Gosnell did not think worthy of
clinic visit).
29. See id. at 23, 25.
30. See id. at 25 (finding that “Gosnell and his employees performed abortions
long after the legal limit”).
31. Id. (“He [ ] killed live, viable, moving, breathing, crying babies.  He killed
them by cutting their spinal cords after their mothers had delivered them after
receiving excessive amounts of medication designed to induce active labor.  This
report documents multiple murders of viable babies.  The evidence makes a com-
pelling case that many others were also murdered.”). See generally id. at 99-116
(“Section IV: The Intentional Killing of Viable Babies”).
32. See Joseph A. Slobodzian, Worker in Gosnell’s Abortion Clinic Pleads Guilty to
Two Murders, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2011, at B1.
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The place from which I write on this difficult subject of law and its
intersections with what some might label morality, which I will term ethics
(to signal what we owe in good faith to each other), is a complex one.
Among the contexts producing those complexities are these: I am a mem-
ber of the faculty of a Catholic law school; I am a practicing Christian who
is a member of an Episcopalian parish; and I am the stepmother of a
much-loved adopted child whose unmarried birth mother gave life to him
in a nation where to raise him, as a single woman, would have been
marked with cultural shame that would have had many real consequences
for mother and son.  And I am all too aware as a scholar of the ways in
which both forced reproduction and legally or culturally coerced abortion
have been used and continue to be used, in the service of genocide, ra-
cism, misogyny, or economic greed backed by the sanction of law which
reduced human beings to livestock or only valued them if they were
stamped at birth with the material cachet of maleness, in this nation and
beyond it, in the realms of then and now.
In a range of ways, then, what I see from where I find myself proceeds
precisely from that location: in at least some of the multiple “excluded
middles” between the binary (signaled by those banal and inadequate la-
bels: pro-choice and pro-life) for what ethical subjects should commit
themselves to in this battle, for a battle of dimensions at once constitu-
tional and nationally epic33 I indeed take it to be.  That is, these opposi-
tions struggle against one another as we reason our way through the
question of abortion and its relations with law to account for the phenom-
enon of Kermit Gosnell across a complex congeries of history, morality,
ethics, race, gendered sexual subordination, sexuality, wealth, and power.
To the extent that my listing both “morality” and “ethics” in the previous
sentence might beg questions, let me note that I take morality to be incul-
cated by faith or dictate, and ethics—in the sense generated by the Jewish
philosopher of ethics Emmanuel Le´vinas34 and his feminist glossators—to
stand for the recognition of the primacy of every other subject with whom
the ethical subject comes into relation.
But let me begin at the beginning, with the Report of the Grand Jury,
apparently authored by Philadelphia District Attorney R. Seth Williams
(an adjunct faculty member at the law school where I teach) or a
subordinate, summarizing what his investigating grand jury found, and
duly accepted by the Honorable Rene´e Cardwell Hughes, then (before
her recent retirement from the bench) a highly respected and exper-
ienced member of the Court of Common Pleas in the Criminal Trial Divi-
sion of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania (and likewise an adjunct
33. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (writing famously that “[n]o set of legal institu-
tions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning” and thus that “[f]or every constitution there is an epic”).
34. See generally EMMANUEL LE´VINAS, HUMANISM OF THE OTHER (1972).
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-MAY-12 15:17
2012] ENGAGING IN GOOD FAITH 87
faculty member here).  But as I begin to do so, let me acknowledge that
the grand jury report tells a story of my own community.
Euphemism, like cash, blanketed what really went on at the Women’s
Medical Society, the abortion clinic for the poor, the marginalized, and
the desperate on Lancaster Avenue in West Philadelphia, housed in a
brick building in a poverty- and violence-stricken, majority-black section of
the city.  The grand jury “estimate[d] that Gosnell took in as much as
$10,000 to $15,000 a night, mostly in cash, for a few hours of work per-
forming abortions.  And this amount does not include the money he made
as one of the top Oxycontin prescribers in the state.”35  As for the euphe-
mism, a preliminary explanation is in order.
The report suggests that Gosnell’s lack of medical skill36 led to his
preferring, in second- and illegal third-trimester abortions, the method of
inducing labor and delivering the fetus over dismembering the fetus in
utero while removing it; or intact partial-birth abortion (before the latter
was banned federally in 2007); or partial-birth abortion’s successor tech-
nique of choice among those who perform late-term abortions37 (which
make up “[b]arely 1 percent” of the 1.2 million abortions performed na-
tionally38), labor-induction abortion, before which the fetus is injected in
utero with a feticidal agent.  He was, after all, not qualified under Penn-
sylvania law to be the only licensed medical practitioner at an abortion
clinic, which was the state of affairs for many years at the Women’s Medi-
cal Center.  He was not a board-certified OB/GYN, having failed to com-
plete a residency in obstetrics and gynecology early in his career.39  The
alternative explanation for Gosnell’s practice was that it enabled his un-
trained staff to attend to delivery of fetuses or viable infants40 (who would
subsequently be killed) while he was elsewhere.
35. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 23; see also id. at 28, (noting
that as Gosnell’s late-term abortion practice relied on patients paying in advance
“in full, typically in cash”); id. at 100 (noting that Gosnell “normally charged
$1,625 for 23-24 week abortions” and that illegal post-twenty-four week abortions
cost $2,500).
36. See id. at 31 (reporting testimony of medical expert who described “signifi-
cant risks” involved in Gosnell’s chosen methods and explained that “labor induc-
tion should be performed only in a hospital setting”).
37. Brian Palmer, What Made George Tiller So Special?: He Did the Abortion Proce-
dures that Other Doctors Couldn’t or Wouldn’t Do, SLATE (June 1, 2009, 6:48 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/
what_made_george_tiller_so_special.html (describing labor-induction technique
and noting murder of Kansas doctor who performed such abortions).
38. Rob Stein, Statistics Unclear on Late-in-Pregnancy Abortions, WASH. POST, July
24, 2011, at A8.
39. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 38 (noting that Gosnell was
“not an obstetrician or gynecologist, much less a board-certified one”).
40. Whether a fetus is “viable” depends on the age of the fetus prior to
delivery.
9
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Even when he performed his version of intact dilation and evacua-
tion/extraction,41 or partial-birth abortion, Gosnell did things in a radi-
cally different way.  Partial-birth abortion entailed delivering the fetal body
intact through the cervix into the vagina42 with the fetal skull still in the
uterus, then “collaps[ing] the fetal skull by making an incision at the base
of the neck and suctioning the contents” or reducing the size of the fetal
head in some other way, before removing the fetus completely from the
uterus and delivering it vaginally.43
Gosnell, however, delivered babies head-first, either waiting till the
baby was partially or fully outside the vagina before killing viable infants by
cutting their spinal cords and then “sometimes suction[ing] skulls as
well,”44 although there was by that stage no reason to do the latter other
than the performative (or the ex post facto attempt to defeat investigation
as to whether neonaticide or partial-birth abortion had occurred).  After
2007,45 apparently Gosnell
tried a few times to use a new procedure: He tried to inject a
drug called digoxin into the fetus’s heart while it was in the
womb.  This was supposed to cause fetal demise in utero.  But
because Gosnell was not skillful enough to successfully adminis-
ter digoxin, late-term babies continued to be born alive, and he
continued to kill them by slitting their necks.46
Gosnell’s grisly practice was blanketed in euphemism by him and his staff.
Live babies whose birth was induced were described as having “precipi-
tated,” including into toilets, where they sometimes stayed for hours,47 if
no one who was charged with killing them was at the clinic.  Neonaticide
via severing of the spinal cord was referred to by Gosnell and his employ-
ees as a “snip.”48  Under cover of euphemism, depravity bred:
[Clinic employee Kareema] Cross saw [untrained clinic em-
ployee Lynda] Williams slit the neck of a baby . . . who had been
moving and breathing for approximately twenty minutes.  Gosnell
had delivered the baby and put it on a counter while he suc-
41. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 138-40 (2007) (describing partial-
birth abortion procedure).
42. This is in contrast to dismembering the fetus—sometimes with the prepa-
ration of injecting a feticidal agent—during the process of removing it from the
uterus, with attendant risks of fetal parts either damaging the uterus or being left
behind.
43. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 108; see also Gonzales, 550
U.S. at 138-40 (describing alternative procedures for reducing size of fetal head).
44. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 109.
45. Gosnell told his staff sometime after 2005 that the law had changed and
that he had to change his late-term abortion procedure as a result. See id. at 111.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (referring to “precipitations” as routine practice); id.
at 64 (setting forth testimony of worker who witnessed precipitations).
48. Id. at 112.
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tioned the placenta from the mother.  Williams called Cross over
to look at the baby because it was breathing and moving its arms
when Williams pulled on them.  After playing with the baby, Wil-
liams slit its neck.49
I recall noticing the Women’s Medical Society as I drove past it before
I knew from the media reports after Gosnell’s arrest, and then in greater
detail from the grand jury report, what happened there.  Why?  Because it
marked the corner where I turned from Lancaster Avenue onto 38th
Street, and thus drove towards the University of Pennsylvania.  Lancaster
Avenue connects Philadelphia’s storied Main Line, where I live, a
predominantly white and high-income suburban enclave, with the major-
ity-black city of Philadelphia.  And as it does so it passes through one of
many parts of urban Philadelphia where the poverty that divides black and
white America begs to be acknowledged.50
Those drives now seem imbued with savage irony: Our SPCA-adopted
cat had developed a rare oral tumor, which led to treatment at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania’s Matthew J. Ryan Veterinary Hospital, the cost of
which would have procured an unlawful third-trimester abortion at the
hands of Kermit Gosnell51 or one of his largely untrained and entirely
unqualified staff, together with the highest-purchasable level of anesthe-
sia,52 administered via intravenous sedation by an untrained and unli-
censed worker53 who might have been fifteen-year-old high school
sophomore Ashley Baldwin.  Had I sought (some)54 services at Gosnell’s
49. Id. at 104.
50. See, e.g., FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CTR., FOOD HARDSHIP IN AMERICA –
2010: DATA FOR THE NATION, STATES, 100 MSAS, AND EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DIS-
TRICT 6-7 (2011) available at http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
food_hardship_report_mar2011.pdf (ranking congressional districts in order of
food hardship and including Pennsylvania’s First Congressional District, which en-
compasses part of Lancaster Avenue corridor, as congressional district with fourth
highest food-hardship risk nationwide).
51. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, app. C.
52. See id. app. B.
53. See id. at 23-24 (noting that “[e]mployees at the Women’s Medical Soci-
ety] knew that Gosnell chose unlicensed, untrained, and unsupervised workers to
anesthetize his abortion patients, and that the drugs, in accordance with his office
procedure, were administered in the doctor’s absence”).
54. Certain services provided by Gosnell might be covered by my medical ben-
efits package, although my insurance likely does not cover abortion. See generally
Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst.,
New York, N.Y.), Mar. 22, 2012, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/state
center/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf.  A federally supported study conducted by the
Guttmacher Institute found that in 2002, 87% of typical employer-based insurance
policies covered abortions in more than just very limited circumstances (such as
rape and incest, or to protect the woman’s life). See Memo on Private Insurance Cov-
erage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/
media/inthenews/2011/01/19/index.html.  However,
[t]he Kaiser Family Foundation found that 46% of covered workers had
coverage for abortion; the data were released as part of Kaiser’s 2003 An-
nual Employer Health Benefits Survey.  Another iteration of that survey,
11
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clinic, as occasionally economically privileged white women did,55 I would
have been able to claim at least some of the fee from my medical insur-
ance provider or my Flexible Spending Account.
But the poor women of color who characteristically suffered butchery
at the hands of Gosnell and his staff generally paid cash,56 and were un-
likely to be medically insured.57  Poverty and the concomitant risk of not
having health insurance have a significant link with the decision to seek an
abortion:
Contraceptive use is a key predictor of women’s recourse to
abortion.  The very small group of American women who are at
risk of experiencing an unintended pregnancy but are not using
contraceptives account for almost half of all abortions.  Many of
these women did not think they would get pregnant or had con-
cerns about contraceptive methods.  The remainder of abortions
occur among the much larger group of women who were using
contraceptives in the month they became pregnant.  Many of
these women report difficulty using contraceptives consistently.58
“About half of unintended pregnancies occur among the 11% of women
who are at risk but are not using contraceptives.  Most of these women
have practiced contraception in the past.”59  Gosnell’s illicit abortion prac-
from 2010, found that three in 10 employers said they covered elective
abortion, but the 2010 survey had a far higher rate of employers who
could not or would not answer the question (71% in 2010 vs. 26% in
2003).
Id.  The Affordable Care Act leaves private coverage of abortions largely un-
touched. See id. (“[T]he health care reform law passed by Congress in 2010—the
Affordable Care Act (ACA)—does not mandate abortion coverage, either now or
in the future.  Rather, it maintains the legal status quo, under which insurance
companies decide whether abortion will be covered in the plans they offer.”).
However, if health plans on exchanges offer abortion coverage, “subscribers who
get federal subsidies will have to make separate premium payments for the cover-
age.  States can prohibit abortion coverage.” How the Health Care Overhaul Could
Affect You, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/
03/21/us/health-care-reform.html.  It has been argued that this will be a disincen-
tive to insurance providers to provide abortion coverage. See, e.g., Memo on Private
Insurance Coverage of Abortion, supra.
55. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 61-62.  Had I done so,
Gosnell, rather than an untrained staff member, would have administered anesthe-
sia to me had I sought it, as he did only for white patients.  I would not have shared
filthy waiting rooms which the black and Asian women who formed a large part of
Gosnell’s clientele were relegated to.
56. See id. at 23, 28.
57. This can be inferred from their poverty and their cash payments for
abortions.
58. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE FACTS ABOUT ABORTION: PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2011),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/pennsylvania.pdf.
59. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst.,
New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2011, at 2, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
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tice was significantly patronized by black and Asian women: “[e]ight per-
cent of women who have abortions have never used a method of birth
control; nonuse is greatest among those who are young, poor, black, His-
panic or less educated.”60  As the director of government affairs at the
Guttmacher Institute puts it,
The truth is that behind virtually every abortion is an unintended
pregnancy. . . .  Not surprisingly, the variation in abortion rates
across racial and ethnic groups relates directly to the variation in
the unintended pregnancy rates across those same groups.
Black women are not alone in having disproportionately
high unintended pregnancy and abortion rates.  The abortion
rate among Hispanic women, for example, although not as high
as the rate among black women, is double the rate among
whites. . . .  Black women’s unintended pregnancy rates are the
highest of all.  These higher unintended pregnancy rates reflect
the particular difficulties that many women in minority commu-
nities face in accessing high-quality contraceptive services and in
using their chosen method of birth control consistently and ef-
fectively over long periods of time.  Moreover, these realities
must be seen in a larger context in which significant racial and
ethnic disparities persist for a wide range of health outcomes,
from diabetes to heart disease to breast and cervical cancer to
sexually transmitted infections (STI), including HIV.
. . . .
The disparities in unintended pregnancy rates result mainly
from similar disparities in access to and effective use of contra-
ceptives.  As of 2002, 15% of black women at risk of unintended
pregnancy (i.e., those who are sexually active, fertile and not
wanting to be pregnant) were not practicing contraception, com-
pared with 12% and 9% of their Hispanic and white counter-
parts, respectively.  These figures—and the disparities among
them—are significant given that, nationally, half of all unin-
tended pregnancies result from the small proportion of women
who are at risk but not using contraceptives.
. . . .
. . .  Geographic access to services is a factor for some women;
however, for many, it is more a matter of being able to afford the
more effective—usually more expensive—prescription methods.
Beyond geographic and financial access, life events such as
relationship changes, moving or personal crises can have a direct
impact on method continuation.  Such events are be [sic] more
common for low-income and minority women than for others,
and may contribute to unstable life situations where consistent
60. Id. at 1-2.
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use of contraceptives is lower priority than simply getting by.  In
addition, a woman’s frustration with a birth control method can
result in her skipping pills or not using condoms every time.  Mi-
nority women, women who are poor and women with little edu-
cation are more likely than women overall to report
dissatisfaction with either their contraceptive method or pro-
vider.  Cultural and linguistic barriers also can contribute to diffi-
culties in method continuation.61
One nagging question that the grand jury report leaves only partly
answered was how Gosnell was able to fly under the radar of law enforce-
ment and regulators for so long, especially as Karnamaya Mongar was not
the first woman to die from the truly inhumane carelessness with which
Gosnell and his staff operated.62  He was apparently widely known on the
grapevine of those in the Philadelphia and Mid-Atlantic medical and abor-
tion clinic world who referred patients to him to run a practice that spe-
cialized in that rarest of abortion specialties: late-term abortions.63
Indeed, it was not Mongar’s death that brought him to the attention of the
authorities.  Rather, a raid that was the culmination of a joint federal and
local law enforcement investigation into his Oxycontin trafficking indi-
rectly alerted authorities to her case.64
Part of the absence of attention paid to Gosnell was governmental.65
The years I spent professionally investigating institutionalized corruption
make me constitutionally suspicious of failures to implement regulation
of—let alone criminally investigate—flagrantly unlawful businesses which
make millions for their owners, particularly when, as in this case, whistles
had been blown.66  Yet the grand jury report paints a compelling picture
of regulators abandoning their duties67 and falling asleep at the wheel,68
and of successive governments—both Republican and Democratic—want-
ing to duck the political bullet they deemed monitoring the operation of
abortion clinics to be.69  That Pennsylvania’s abortion clinic-regulation
statute, amended in the wake of Gosnell’s arrest and charging, includes a
provision allowing for the new standards to be waived, and that the state
Health Department’s announced policy of implementing applications for
61. Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture, 11
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2, 2-4 (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/gpr/11/3/gpr110302.pdf.
62. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 25 (noting that “[a]t least
one other mother died following an abortion in which Gosnell punctured her
uterus and then sent her home”).
63. See id. at 27.
64. See id. at 19-20.
65. See id. at 137-212.
66. See id. at 143-46.
67. See id. at 145-48.
68. See id. at 138-43.
69. See id. at 147-48.
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licensing under the new regulatory regime “on a case-by-case basis,”70 raise
continuing concerns when read against this history of institutionalized
abuse of discretion, however.  Additionally, when one considers how long
Gosnell was able to operate his high-profit charnel house, where abortion
seekers from at least as far away as Virginia learned they could get an ille-
gal post-twenty-four-week abortion, one wonders where the anti-abortion
protestors were.  While protestors readily find legal abortion providers,71 I
can find no evidence that Gosnell’s practice was picketed by pro-life
groups, as, for example, was the clinic of the late Dr. George Tiller.72  How
did Gosnell, who specialized in illegal late-term abortions,73 not attract the
attention of those anti-abortion activists who murdered Dr. Barnett
Slepian, clinic security guard Robert Sanderson, clinic receptionists Shan-
non Lowney and Lee Ann Nichols, Dr. John Britton and clinic escort
James Barrett, and Dr. David Gunn,74 and more recently, Tiller, one of the
few doctors in the nation willing to perform legal late-term abortions?75
After all, in South Dakota earlier this year, the following legislation,
justifying the killing of abortion providers and apparently of women seek-
ing abortion, was passed out of Committee:
FOR AN ACT ENTITLED, An Act to expand the definition of
justifiable homicide to provide for the protection of certain un-
born children.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
SOUTH DAKOTA:
Section 1. That § 22-16-34 be amended to read as follows:
22-16-34. Homicide is justifiable if committed by any person
while resisting any attempt to murder such person, or to harm the
unborn child of such person in a manner and to a degree likely to result
in the death of the unborn child, or to commit any felony upon him
or her, or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person is.
Section 2. That § 22-16-35 be amended to read as follows:
70. See Levy, supra note 24, at B3.
71. Picket, Vigil, Sidewalk Counseling Sites, CALENDAR FOR LIFE, http://
www.calendarforlife.org/librarycfl/VigilLibrary01.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
72. See Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor Slain by Gunman in Kansas
Church, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A1.
73. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 27-28.
74. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., ANTI-CHOICE VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDA-
TION 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/
abortion-access-to-abortion-violence.pdf.
75. I use the term to distinguish Tiller’s practice from Gosnell’s, while regis-
tering that critics of Tiller have made similar allegations to some of those leveled at
Gosnell, with the exception of neonaticide.
15
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22-16-35. Homicide is justifiable if committed by any person
in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or her husband,
wife, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant, or the unborn child
of any such enumerated person, if there is reasonable ground to ap-
prehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great per-
sonal injury, and imminent danger of such design being
accomplished.76
I will return to this legislative initiative and another, less obviously
homicidal, yet also failed one from Mississippi that is nonetheless being
widely promoted nationally as I conclude this Essay.  But then I suspect
that backyard abortionists rarely were or are so picketed or targeted by
community-based vigilantes: they are providing a service that only the poor
and desperate in their local community or communities of poverty or
color (linked to them by the informational capillary of desperation) seek,
and that desperation keeps communities quiet and the backyard abortion-
ists, licensed or unlicensed, who serve them invisible to the authorities,
otherwise protected.  But other questions persist.
Why does a woman who can afford and obtain a legal abortion by
competent, licensed medical practitioners with expertise in the operation,
in desperate need or moral peril (depending on where one stands on
complex questions of individual morality and free will and patriarchal
power and economic inequality and racial, socioeconomic, and sex equal-
ity), come to butchers like Gosnell?77  Why do they come so late in their
pregnancies?
Let me start with the woman, now dead, in the absence of whose
desperation the law would not apparently have caught up with Kermit Gos-
nell. En passant, let me address the practices of those few doctors who are
willing to perform late-term abortions, legal or illegal—a group signifi-
cantly over-represented among victims of contemporary domestic terror-
ism—and the types of conditions under which such doctors, unlike Kermit
Gosnell or the imaginary doctor who might have removed the unsightly
bulge in prom-girl’s dress, agree to perform such surgery.  Gosnell was, to
put it bluntly, no more than a medically licensed backyard abortionist, as
my reading of the grand jury report that led to his charging has suggested.
He was also one of the few licensed medical practitioners in the country
who would perform third-trimester abortions.78
Some of his brethren are clearly arrant scofflaws, careless of their pa-
tients’ safety, evidently in it for the money.  Take late-term abortionist
76. H.B. 1171, 2011 Leg. Assemb., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011), available at http://
legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2011/Bills/HB1171HJU.pdf.
77. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 25, at 24-25 (noting that Gosnell’s
employees certainly did not have adequate training).
78. See id. at 27-28; see also Palmer, supra note 37.
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Steven Brigham,79 whose history of injuring women led to the termination
of his licenses to practice medicine in Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida
and the suspension of his license in New Jersey.80  He also flouted the law
in other ways: in April 2010, a $234,536 lien for unpaid payroll taxes was
imposed on him by the IRS.81  His most recent business operation in-
volved performing late-term abortions, putatively in Maryland, which has
some of the least restrictive laws on late-term abortions in the nation,82 but
where Brigham is not licensed yet maintains an office.
With his New Jersey medical license reinstated, he evaded the restric-
tions that New Jersey’s ban on late-term abortions (none of his N.J. clinics
can meet the standards for performing abortions after the fourteenth
week of pregnancy). Notwithstanding his lack of a Maryland medical li-
cense, he continued to put women’s lives and health at risk.  He devel-
oped a scheme whereby abortions were begun in New Jersey by means of
inserting rods designed to widen the cervix (a practice not covered by New
Jersey abortion law), and then led caravans of women, each following him
in a separate car, to his Maryland clinics, where Maryland-licensed surro-
gates performed the late-term abortions the patients sought.
In one such case, an eighteen-year-old woman, twenty-one weeks preg-
nant, having had dilating rods inserted in her cervix by Brigham on Au-
gust 12, followed him to Maryland on August 13, where he supervised a
Maryland-licensed family physician in performing an abortion which left
the woman with a perforated uterus and cuts in the walls of her bowel and
vagina, bleeding, and semiconscious.  Brigham then put the woman in the
back of a rental car and drove her to a nearby hospital, where he and his
surrogate effectively dumped her, being evasive with hospital staff in the
process,83 the surrogate having earlier refused to call an ambulance at the
request of the woman’s mother and boyfriend.  Her injuries were suffi-
ciently severe and complex for her to be airlifted to Johns Hopkins.
As in Gosnell’s case, the subsequent clinic raids failed to find the pa-
tient records they sought, but they did find evidence that abortions had
been performed on fetuses thirty-six weeks in age, just two weeks before
the full term of a normal pregnancy.  Brigham and Nicola Riley, the surro-
gate who performed this abortion, have been charged with varying counts
of murder and conspiracy to commit murder under Maryland’s fetal homi-
cide law based on the finding of thirty-five “later-term fetuses, about 20 to
79. See Marie McCullough, Abortion Provider Steven Brigham Charged with Murder
in Maryland, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 31, 2011, at A1.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Cf. Peter Hermann, Doctors in Botched Elkton Abortion Face Murder Charges,
BALT. SUN, Dec. 30, 2011, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/breaking/bs-md-
elkton-abortion-arrests-20111230,0,3963352.story (“Maryland is one of 38 states
with a fetal homicide law.  But unlike many, Maryland does not define when it is
too late to perform an abortion.”).
83. See id.
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35 weeks old, in a freezer” at the doctors’ Elkton clinic.84  The murder
charges also relate to the seriously injured victim’s 21.5-week-old fetus.85
Then there are the “legal” late-term abortionists, who are depicted
as—and often depict themselves as—crusaders.  Their work is controver-
sial not merely because they abort viable fetuses, but because the legal
rubric under which they do so is regarded by anti-abortionists as a cipher
for abortion on demand.  The late George Tiller, developer of the outpa-
tient labor induction abortion technique, was renowned for his ability to
ensure maternal safety in the case of labor inductions.86  Other doctors
and indeed hospitals referred patients to Tiller because of his expertise in
“treating the emotional and physical strain” of these abortions.87  Tiller
himself claimed that most of the abortions he performed (which were
more or less exclusively late-term) were due to the health of the mother,
with the balance due to fetal abnormality.88  A significant number of the
fetuses were viable; in the case of every viable fetus, maternal health was
the reason for the abortion.89
Most of the maternal health problems, which made up the significant
majority of the late-term abortions performed by Tiller, whether or not
the fetus was viable at the time of the abortion, were “mental health”
problems.90  It is this diagnosis which, as indicated supra, anti-abortionists
regard as allowing abortion on demand, and to which Tiller obliquely re-
ferred to when he said “‘it is unplanned and unwanted motherhood that
shipwrecks women’s lives, not unplanned pregnancy.’”91  Most of Tiller’s
patients were out-of-state referrals.92  LeRoy Carhart, on the other hand,
discussing his recent decision to travel from his home state of Nebraska to
84. Peter Hermann, 2 Doctors Face Murder Charges under State Fetal Homicide
Law, WASH. POST., Dec. 31, 2011, at B4.  The fetuses had apparently been injected
with feticidal agents in Voorhees, N.J., and then were removed in Elkton, MD. See
Marie McCullough, Murder Charges for Abortion Doctor, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 7, 2012,
at B1.
85. See McCullough, supra note 84, at B4.
86. See W. Martin Haskell et al., Surgical Abortion After the First Trimester, in A
CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION ch. 10 (Maureen Paul et
al. eds., 1999), available at http://nafresources.org/textbook/pdf/Chapter_10.
pdf.
87. Palmer, supra note 37.
88. See Julie-Ann Davies, Abortionist Backs Sex Selection, AGE (Austl.), Nov. 15,
1999, at 3.
89. See Brian D. Parks, Statistics on Post-viability Abortions Performed by George
Tiller, ABORTION ESSAY (July 13, 2002), http://www.abortionessay.com/files/Tiller.
html.
90. See id.
91. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting George R. Tiller).
92. See id. (estimating that 97% of Tiller’s patients came from outside
Kansas).
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Maryland to perform abortions, claims that “severe fetal abnormalities”
are the reason for women turning to him for late-term abortions.93
As with Gosnell, although Tiller’s skill level was clearly vastly superior
to Gosnell’s and Tiller operated inside the law, one wonders why these
women were candidates for late-term abortion if they could have obtained
lawful abortions before undergoing the grueling horror of partial-birth
abortions, of abortions Gosnell-style, or, after the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, of digoxin induction.  The statistics give some
indication.  Many of Tiller’s patients were young: a staggering 217 in 1999
were under the age of twenty.94  This fits with national statistics: 18% of
those who have abortions in the United States are teenagers, and
“[w]omen in their 20s account for more than half of all abortions.”95  A
significant majority are also poor.96  Tiller claimed:
We have made higher education possible. . . .  We have
helped correct some of the results of rape and incest.  We have
helped battered women escape to a safer life.  We have made re-
covery from chemical dependency possible.  We have helped wo-
men and families struggle to save their unwell, unborn child a
lifetime of pain.97
What else led them to travel to Kansas, or indeed to West Philadel-
phia, so late in their pregnancies?  Perhaps a lack of access to legal abor-
tion in their local area?  Eighty-seven percent of United States counties
lacked an abortion provider in 2008.98  And the history of the personnel
who performed abortions and the locations where they were practiced
post-Roe is signal: The practice moved out of hospitals into clinics, and
medical schools stopped teaching the procedure because it was stigma-
tized and because it was dangerous.99  There were murders of abortion
providers and clinic staffers, attempted murders, arsons, bombings and
bomb threats, threats to an abortion-provider’s wife, and other intimida-
tion to contend with.100
93. See Lena H. Sun, From Abortion Provider to Activist, WASH. POST., July 25,
2011, at A1.  Carhart’s Maryland abortions are performed between eighteen and
twenty-four weeks and may be performed as late as thirty-two weeks. Id. at A8.
94. See Parks, supra note 89.
95. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 59, at 1.
96. See id. (noting that “[42%] of women obtaining abortions have incomes
below 100% of the federal poverty level” and 27% “have incomes between 100-
199% of the federal poverty level”).
97. David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 59, at 2.
99. See generally Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2010, at MM30.
100. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 74, at 3-7 (detailing
threats to abortion providers and their family members).  This intimidation in-
cluded chemical attacks and anthrax threats. See id. at 5-7.
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One pro-life organization sent a “joke” booklet to over 33,000 medical
students “recommend[ing] that physicians who provide abortion care
should be shot, attacked by dogs, and buried in concrete,” and the organi-
zation has begun distributing a pamphlet to potential providers of RU 486
threatening that “ ‘[p]hysicians who perform chemical abortions will be
identified, labeled, exposed, stigmatized, ostracized, and in every way
treated exactly the same as conventional abortionists.’”101  Even after
pushback about the low training rates, political will was rallied to limit its
effect via federal legislation: Only about half the nation’s OB/GYN resi-
dency programs offer abortion training.102  For another 40%, it is
elective.103
Even so, why pay so much money to a butcher like Gosnell and, as in
Karnamaya Mongar’s case, travel so far to find him?  Early surgical abor-
tions are relatively cheap and relatively easy to secure, provided that one
has physical access to a clinic and can meet the relevant state’s require-
ment for a lawful abortion.  In 2009, $451 was the average charge for a
“nonhospital abortion with local anesthesia at 10 weeks gestation.”104
While 95% of abortion providers “offer abortion at eight weeks from the
last menstrual period[,] . . . [o]nly 11% of all abortion providers offer
abortions at 24 weeks.”105  Since the FDA approval of RU 486, 59% of
abortion providers offered it, with 9% or more only providing early-medi-
cation abortion.  In 2008, early-medication abortion made up “about one-
quarter of abortions before nine weeks’ gestation.”106
One thing we can conclude from all of this is that Gosnell’s practice,
like the incidence of illegal abortion in the United States before Roe, is
evidence that banning or legislatively limiting the availability of legal abor-
tions does not stop women from seeking illegal abortions or unscrupulous
providers from providing them, often in conditions that put poor women
at a disproportionate risk of death or maiming.107  It is also evident that
women who seek late-term abortions are likely to be desperate.  And in-
deed the statistics bear that out: “Teens are more likely than older women
to delay having an abortion until after 15 weeks of pregnancy,” and
“[f]ifty-eight percent of abortion patients say they would have liked to have
had their abortion earlier.  Nearly 60% of women who experienced a delay
in obtaining an abortion cite the time it took to make arrangements and
raise money.”108  We know something, then, about who has abortions, par-
ticularly late-term abortions, in the post-Roe United States.  The distinctive
101. Id. at 9 (quoting pamphlet distributed by Life Dynamics, Inc.).
102. See Bazelon, supra note 99.
103. See id.
104. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 59, at 1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE Roe v. Wade: Voices That
Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court’s Ruling 3, 7-8 (2010).
108. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 59, at 2.
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history of U.S. abortion law should also inform the frame of reference
through which we seek to understand what drove women to Gosnell, to
Brigham, to the backyarders likely to be operating throughout the United
States whether licensed or not, and what drove some women to self-abort
“with medications like misoprostal (which induces painful contractions
and eventual delivery) or herbal concoctions,” even in jurisdictions like
New York where legal abortions can be obtained.  We should note, in the
cases of women who self-abort, the effects of being both uninsured and
unable to afford the large cash payments Gosnell’s patients routinely
made, or of possessing a cultural “mistrust [of] the medical system.”109
One of this last group is Yaribely Almonte, who has recently been charged
in New York with self-abortion of a male fetus.110  But before we turn to
history, what can the woman who put an end to Gosnell’s practice by pay-
ing with her life add to the story?
Karnamaya Mongar gazes out from a page of the grand jury report.111
A smile hovers around her lips.  Her husband’s hand is draped affection-
ately over the shoulder of her simple print dress.  They are both thin and
look tired.  This is unsurprising.  She had arrived in the United States only
four months before her death.  She died as a result of a fatal drug over-
dose at Gosnell’s clinic, which followed its usual procedure for aborting a
fetus as developed as Mrs. Mongar’s.  Mrs. Mongar was nineteen-weeks
pregnant, within the second trimester, and thus not subject to the extra
regulations that are required for a request for the abortion of a fetus at
twenty-four or more weeks from gestation—the viability standard.
Before Mrs. Mongar arrived in the United States with her husband
Ash, three children, and one grandchild, she had spent the preceding
twenty years in a refugee camp in Nepal.112  The Mongar family and many
of their Bhutanese countrymen and women had been expelled from Bhu-
tan following pro-democracy agitation, and the Mongar family was finally
settled in Virginia on July 19, 2009, as the result of a humanitarian resettle-
ment initiative.113  Ash found a job in a chicken factory.114  It is unclear at
what time in this resettlement saga Mrs. Mongar became pregnant; but, at
eighteen weeks and accompanied by a family friend, she sought an abor-
tion at a clinic in Virginia and one in Washington, D.C., neither of which
would perform a second-trimester abortion.  Those clinics referred her to
Gosnell, who “had a reputation for performing abortions regardless of ges-
tational age.”115
109. Anemona Hartocollis, After Fetus Is Found in Trash, a Rare Charge of Self-
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at A32.
110. See id.




115. Id. at 118.
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We do not know why Karnamaya Mongar sought an abortion.  We do
know:
[T]hree-fourths [of American women] cite concern for or re-
sponsibility to other individuals [as their reason for seeking an
abortion]; three-fourths say they cannot afford a child; three-
fourths say that having a baby would interfere with work, school
or the ability to care for dependants; and half say they do not
want to be a single parent or are having problems with their hus-
band or partner.116
We also know that very young women and poor women disproportionately
seek abortions and that 45% of women who seek abortions are single.117
Black women and Hispanic women seek abortions at rates in excess of
their representation in the community—30% and 25%, respectively118—
and black and Hispanic women experience unintended pregnancies at
rates of 64% and 54%, respectively.
We also know that some other groups of women are at higher risk for
finding themselves pregnant in situations where any pregnancy that re-
sults, like the sex that produces it, is compelled.  College women in the
United States, for example, experience sexual victimization at high
rates.119  The recent prosecution of a member of Northern Virginia’s “vio-
lent Mara Salvatrucha street gang” for prostituting a twelve-year-old run-
away, which followed on the heels of a conviction of another gang
member for prostituting two juveniles,120 read against Philippe Bourgois’
social anthropology of a criminal gang subculture,121 suggests there are
places in both our colleges and in our cities where girls and very young
women are subject to sexual coercion that is so normalized that they may
not understand it as constituting rape.
If that is the picture now, who had abortions in the tumultuous years
leading up to Roe?  “Between 1951 and 1962, over 92 percent of women
who received hospital abortions in New York City were white, while over
three-quarters of those who died from illegal abortions in the city were
women of color.”122  In 1967, the Clergy Statement on Abortion Law Re-
form and Consultation Service on Abortion reported that a “1965 report
shows that 94% of abortion deaths in New York City occurred among Ne-
116. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 59, at 1.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See generally BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 182369,
THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN (2000), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf.
120. Victor Zapana, Gang Member Convicted of Prostituting Girl, 12, WASH. POST.,
July 29, 2011, at B3.
121. See generally PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN
EL BARRIO 213-317 (2d ed. 2003).
122. Susan Brownmiller, Everywoman’s Abortions: “The Oppressor Is Man”, in
GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 127, 127.
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groes and Puerto Ricans.”123  In 1969, Frances Beal reported that
“[n]early half of the child-bearing deaths in New York City were attributed
to abortion alone and out of these, 79% are among non-whites and Puerto
Rican women.”124  College-level women were also over-represented among
those seeking abortions in the late 1950s.125  The collateral “price” of an
abortion, frequently exacted on women of color126 but not exclusively
so,127 was that she agree to be sterilized.  One doctor testified:
That [the doctor] . . . had to decline almost daily requests over
the years, many of which were medically or psychiatrically indi-
cated but illegal under the law; that many of the pregnant wo-
men turned away later had illegal abortions by unqualified
persons; that [the doctor] has had to treat many women, includ-
ing some of those [she] declined to abort, who were infected,
some of whom were in serious Danger [sic] of death.128
Many of the early efforts to procure safe abortions for women were availa-
ble to the moneyed.  For example, legal abortions were available to Ameri-
can women in Japan,129 and Yale founded an early Sex Counseling Service
for its students in 1969 that arranged for safe medical abortions.130
III. COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Let me frame the concluding, constitutional section of my engage-
ment with Professor Calhoun by suggesting that the social harm repre-
sented by Kermit Gosnell has to do with the constitutionalization of an
increasingly limited—and indeed in my judgment constitutionally frag-
ile—”right” to an abortion under the differing statutory schemes adopted
by the states after Roe,131 and adjusted in the wake of Roe’s progeny, in-
123. Clergy Statement on Abortion Law Reform and Consultation Service on
Abortion (1967), reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 29, 30.
124. Frances Beal, Black Women’s Manifesto; Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and
Female, reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 49, 52.
125. Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, in
GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 22, 22.
126. See Beal, supra note 124, at 51 (noting that continuation of welfare bene-
fits for poor women of color seeking abortions was often made contingent on
sterilization).
127. See Brownmiller, supra note 122, at 129.
128. Affidavit of Dr. Jane E. Hodgson, State v. Hodgson (D. Ct. Minn. 2000),
reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 21, 21.
129. See generally GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 8-11 (reprinting
“list of instructions for getting an abortion in Japan” from unknown source).
130. See generally Phillip M. Sarel & Lorna J. Sarrel, A Sex Counseling Service
for College Students, reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 58; Pam-
phlet, Student Comm. on Human Sexuality, Sex and the Yale Student (1970), re-
printed in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 63.
131. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing abortion
right emanating from constitutionally derived right to personal privacy and gener-
ating trimester-based metric for constitutionality of state regulation of abortion,
with its particular emphases on first trimester and fetal viability).
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cluding Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,132 Hodgson v. Minnesota,133
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,134 Stenberg v. Car-
hart,135 and Gonzales v. Carhart.136  It is, thus, distinctively American: the
late Justice Brennan famously spoke of our national habit of turning social
problems into legal problems for resolution by the Supreme Court.137  It
132. 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (conceding that Roe’s holding involved “a lib-
erty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” rejecting Roe’s trimester system,
and upholding state law that required testing for fetal viability before performing
abortion after twentieth week of pregnancy).
133. 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding two-parent notification law with judicial-
bypass provision).
134. 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that before fetal
viability, state law “may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision
to terminate her pregnancy”).  A state may not impose an “undue burden” on a
woman’s right of reproductive choice, which would be constituted by a law whose
“purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability,” but not by one which did “no more
than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian
of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn [and does not
constitute] . . . a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to
choose.” Id. at 877-78.
135. 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (finding unconstitutional Nebraska statute that
banned partial-birth abortion on vagueness grounds and because, contrary to un-
due burden test articulated in Casey, it provided no exception for health of
mother).
136. 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007) (holding that Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act was constitutional).  The Act outlawed “a variation on” the “usual second-
trimester abortion procedure, ‘dilation and evacuation,’” “intact dilation and ex-
traction,” or “dilation and extraction,” which entailed the delivery of all of the
fetus except the head:
“At this point, the right-handed surgeon slides the fingers of the left
[hand] along the back of the fetus and “hooks” the shoulders of the fetus
with the index and ring fingers (palm down).
“While maintaining this tension, lifting the cervix and applying trac-
tion to the shoulders with the fingers of the left hand, the surgeon takes a
pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum scissors in the right hand.
“He carefully advances the tip, curved down, along the spine and
under his middle finger until he feels it contact the base of the skull
under the tip of his middle finger.
“[T]he surgeon then forces the scissors into the base of the skull or
into the foramen magnum.  Having safely entered the skull, he spreads
the scissors to enlarge the opening.
“The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a suction catheter
into this hole and evacuates the skull contents.  With the catheter still in
place, he applies traction to the fetus, removing it completely from the
patient.”
Id. at 138 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 108-58, at 3 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court found that the Act furthered legit-
imate government interests, was not unconstitutionally vague, and did not “im-
pose[ ] an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion based on its
overbreadth or lack of a health exception”; thus, it survived facial constitutional
attack. Id. at 147, 161, 168.
137. William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at the Georgetown University Text and
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985) (“[F]rom our beginnings, a most important
consequence of the constitutionally created separation of powers has been the
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is also identifiably American, as I will go on to suggest, as a distinctively
problematic variant on the always-contestable incoherence that has de-
fined the development of substantive due process doctrine, which un-
moored constitutional law and threatened its claim to be law at all, let
alone higher law, by bring it uncomfortably close to the illegitimacy that
its entwinement with politics entails.
That proximity to politics was inevitable in this case.  Linda Green-
house and Reva B. Siegel construct a compelling history of the different
political pressures that turned a steady stream of striking down state abor-
tion bans on vagueness grounds138 and the statutory liberalizing of abor-
tion law regimes in some states139 to a congeries of political pressure from
bedfellows as strange as the Black Panthers, the Republican Party, the Na-
tional Association of Evangelicals, and Pope Paul VI, which led to a move-
ment in the opposite direction: passing increasingly restrictive abortion
laws—as happened, for example, in California and New York.  It is also no
accident that the pushback against the liberalization of abortion laws that
set the stage for Roe had as its backdrop the sexual revolution of the 1960s,
a proximate cause of our present culture wars over sexuality.  Reactions
ranging from distaste to moral outrage to intimations of the end of civiliza-
tion as we knew it accompanied what the sexual revolution and the availa-
bility of reliable contraceptives had wrought.
Distinctively American, too, was the litigation strategy adopted in
Roe—to claim a constitutionalized status for the “individual liberty inter-
est” in abortion unregulated by state criminal law—in that it emerged
bearing the sublime American legal institutional pedigree of the fruits of a
senior project of a law student at NYU which was subsequently published
in the University of North Carolina’s Law Review.140  It thus betrays our
(legal educational and scholarly) exceptionalism.  U.S. law reviews, unlike
scholarly journals generally or legal scholarly journals elsewhere, do not
peer review but base their publication decisions on the judgments of their
student academic elite.  Not only are law students, especially those at elite
schools, the arbiters of scholarly merit, they are its measure too: a signifi-
cant majority of the nation’s law professors graduated from a small num-
ber of elite law schools and have none of the scholarly research training
characteristics of research-based doctorates.
American habit, extraordinary to other democracies, of casting social, economic,
philosophical and political questions in the form of law suits, in an attempt to
secure ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court.  In this way, important aspects of
the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy may finally arrive in the
Supreme Court for judicial determination.  Not infrequently, these are the issues
upon which contemporary society is most deeply divided.  They arouse our deepest
emotions.”).
138. See Linda Greenhouse, Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to Abortion?,
reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 130, 132.
139. See generally Ruth Roemer, Abortion Law Reform and Repeal: Legislative and
Judicial Developments, reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 121.
140. See Greenhouse, supra note 139, at 132-39.
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I approach the depravity and inhumanity of the practices Kermit Gos-
nell, a licensed backyard abortionist, visited on women (mainly poor and
of color, often young, almost always desperate, and who paid him in cash
for abortions, which earned him millions) as a comparative constitutional
lawyer, an historian of the American constitutional imaginary, and a stu-
dent of the inequality that always already haunts my adopted country.  As
is perhaps typical in scholars from the land of my birth, I find myself al-
ways looking beyond national boundaries, to nations where selective abor-
tion is practiced on female fetuses and to the fact that female babies are
more frequently given up for adoption at birth in China than in Korea,
where cultural constructions of shame and family honor mean that most
Korean infants made available for international adoption are male.  I
watch as whole regions of rural India, say, experience a shortage of mar-
riageable women141 because of reductions in the female birth rate
through a range of violent methods, including sex-selective abortion and
infanticide, used to avoid paying dowries, resulting in trauma for the wo-
men142 and in some cases polyandry as a local practice.143  Abortion is,
then, always a matter of gender relations under conditions of patriarchy,
of money, and of power, as much as of law and morality, life and choice,
and rights.
This global reflection is not meant to suggest that a markedly superior
doctrinal result from the pro-life perspective to that achieved in Roe would
necessarily have emerged had the strategists of the Roe doctrine looked
outside the United States for sites to ground a constitutional right to abor-
tion, if that was where they had been, uncharacteristically, looking.  Ger-
man abortion law, reflecting the particular string of events in Germany
between 1933 and 1935 that gave rise to the development of modern inter-
national human rights law, enshrines a constitutional right to unborn life
in its Basic Law144 and thus recognizes the state’s broad obligation to pro-
tect fetal life.  It nonetheless decriminalizes abortion, provided it occurs
within the first twelve weeks after conception, after counseling directed “to
the protection of unborn life,” and after a three-day wait unless the abor-
tion is necessary for medical reasons or the pregnancy results from a
141. See generally Robert Kiener, Gendercide Crisis: Can the Lethal Prejudice
Against Girls Be Changed?, 5 C.Q. GLOBAL RESEARCHER 473 (2011), available at http:/
/library.cqpress.com/globalresearcher/getpdf.php?file=cqgr20111004.pdf&PHP
SESSID=lfjlm07hd0qbron4kbqsa2ihd6.
142. See Eve Dwyer, Unequal Sex Ratio, Bride Shortage & Marriage Migration
4-10 (2010) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, London School of Economics & Political
Science), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/anthropology/research/CCPN/publi-
cations/Dissertations/DissertationsCCP/24258.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Sara Sidner, Brothers Share Wife to Secure Family Land, CNN.COM,
Oct. 24, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/24/polyg-
amy.investigation/index.html.
144. Grundgesetz Fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG]
[Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, at art. 2, para. 2, cl. 1 (Ger.), available at http:/
/www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm.
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rape.145  There may be in the German regime, however, some detail that
might deter a desperate woman from resorting to a Gosnell.  The 1993
German Constitutional Court decision on the 1992 post-reunification Ger-
man abortion statute defined the state’s obligation to “protect unborn
life” as extending to
[f]inancial subsidies . . . so that women would not have to abort
from fear of being unable to afford the child.  The state was
obliged to do more to protect women against educational and
occupational disadvantages resulting from pregnancy and child
rearing, especially considering the [constitutional obligation] to
further the equal participation of men and women in working
life.  Social security law needed to take account of periods spent
in uncompensated childrearing.  Landlords could be forbidden
to terminate leases due to increase in family size.  Credit laws
could be reformed to ease repayment burdens after the birth of a
child.  The state needed to do more to create a “child-friendly
society,” recognizing that the raising of children was a service
parents perform to the common benefit.146
The hope for justifying a right to fetal life through borrowings from the
laws of other nations bound by the European Convention on Human
Rights, which enshrines a right to life, is even less promising.  In Ireland—
a signatory to the convention—events following a test-case over a fourteen-
year-old impregnated by a friend’s father resulted in a significant majority
of the Irish population rejecting a proposed strong “right to life” amend-
ment to the Irish constitution at the ballot box and voting to protect the
rights of pregnant women seeking abortion to information about abortion
and to travel outside Ireland to obtain it.147
So, too, Americanness is inscribed in the fact that abortion-rights pro-
ponents of the Roe era focused, discursively, on a distinctively inward-look-
ing national ideological battle.  The authors of the label pro-choice and
the slogan “Free Abortion on Demand” chosen by “woman’s rights”148
proponents were activists so apparently deaf to the power of metaphor,
and lacking a litigator’s ear for echoes from the future, that myth has
placed the latter slogan’s authorship in the pens of those who speak from
145. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 136 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing and quoting German law).
146. Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to
Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 281 (1995) (foot-
notes omitted).
147. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 145, at 201.
148. See Memorandum from Jimmye Kimmey (Dec. 1972), in GREENHOUSE &
SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 33 (discussing Kimmey’s preferred slogan for the pro-life
movement: “Right to Choose”).
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the morally compelling place of life149 over what at times seems the moral
bankruptcy of choice.150
It seems to the constitutionalist in me, whatever our position on the
morality of abortion, that we have two choices if we want to stop Kermit
Gosnell and his ilk, licensed or otherwise, from committing neonaticide;
killing, infecting, and maiming women; and performing illegal abortions.
The first is to leave it to the states and the people to make their voices
heard at the ballot box and reflected in legislation.  Some of those individ-
uals spoke out in the era before Roe, and before the organized backlash
against early laws liberalizing legal abortion started, who were sickened
and saddened enough by the killing and maiming of poor women of
color, college students, and women who would otherwise have been com-
pelled to give birth to and care for life for children with injuries caused by
German measles or Thalidomide to legislate to prevent it.  Women in Mis-
sissippi recently voted down a constitutional provision151 that enshrines a
right to human personhood that begins at conception, one of many cur-
rent state initiatives to include such sentiments.152
A federal constitutional doctrinal alternative to Roe’s always-inferen-
tially illegitimate and increasingly fragile rule might also be found.  In
some of the early suits challenging the constitutionality of state abortion
laws in the United States, theories other than vagueness or the substantive
due process-derived privacy right saw the light of day, including an eco-
nomic equal protection argument153 and a liberty argument not tied to
privacy.154  There is a more compelling textual hook in the Bill of Rights
than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clause for a
constitutional doctrine equal to Kermit Gosnell and his ilk.  Linked both
to equality (for all the constitutional vulnerability of economic equality
claims) and liberty, that source is the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on
badges and incidents of slavery.
Although the Court, having read that provision narrowly, has never
found that forced reproduction falls within the definitional aegis of that
phrase, both historians and thinkers, including the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Bev Cole, have made the link.  King excoriated forced repro-
duction as a constitutional scandal and a badge and incident of slavery
both:
149. See Betty Friedan, Call to Women’s Strike for Equality (Aug. 26, 1970),
reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 41, 44.
150. “Choice,” in this context, connotes willfulness, changeability, consump-
tion, which are all stereotypically negative feminine attributes.
151. See Emily Wagster Pettus, Women Lead Charge Against Miss. Personhood Mea-
sure, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2011, at A21.
152. See Esme´ E. Deprez, Abortion Curb Near Passage, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 5,
2011, at A6.
153. See Women vs. Connecticut Organizing Pamphlet (Nov. 1970), reprinted
in GREENHOUSE & SIGEL, supra note 107, at 167, 174.
154. See id. at 173.
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The Negro family for three hundred years has been on the
tracks of the racing locomotives of American history and was
dragged along mangled and crippled. . . .  American slavery is
distinguished from all other forms because it consciously dehu-
manized the Negro.  In other cultures slaves preserved dignity
and a measure of personality and family life.  Our institution of
slavery began on the coasts of Africa and because the middle pas-
sage was long and expensive, African families were torn apart in
the selective process as if the members were beasts.  On the voy-
ages millions died in holds into which blacks were packed spoon
fashion to live on a journey often of 2 to 6 months with approxi-
mately the room for each equivalent to a coffin.  The sheer physi-
cal torture was sufficient to murder millions of men, women and
children.  But even more incalculable was the psychological dam-
age.  For those who survived as a family group, once more on the
auction block many families were ripped apart.
Against this ghastly background the Negro family began the
process of organization in the United States.  On the plantation
the institution of legal marriage did not exist.  The masters might
direct mating or if they did not intervene marriage occurred
without sanctions.  There were polygamous relationships, fragile,
monogamous relationships, illegitimacies, abandonment, and
most of all, the tearing apart of families as children, husbands, or
wives were sold to other plantations.  But these cruel conditions
were not yet the whole story.  Masters and their sons used Negro
women to satisfy their spontaneous lust or, when a more humane
attitude prevailed, as concubines.  The depth was reached in cer-
tain states, notably Virginia which we sentimentally call the state
of presidents.  In this state, slaves were bred for sale, not casually
or incidentally, but in a vast breeding program which produced
enormous wealth for slave owners.  This breeding program was
the economic answer to the halting of the slave traffic early in the
19th century.155
In 1971, the black feminist activist Bev Cole wrote:
The Black woman throughout history has been a breeder—
breeder of slaves and breeder of slave owners’ bastards.  Then
today, Black men tell Black women to continue to breed, so that
we shall outnumber the White men and seize control.  On July
4th, 1970, the Black Panthers came out with the most absurd
statement, “Black women love children and like large families.”
While the Panthers hopscotch on the subject of the Black wo-
155. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Abbott House, Westchester Cnty.,
N.Y. (Oct. 29, 1965), in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN RE-
PORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 402, 404-05 (1967).
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men’s innate love for children, and declare that the quantity (not
mentioning quality) of forces must be overwhelmed to insure vic-
tory, they also say that the Black man and Black woman must
fight together against the enemy.  How can we have this together-
ness on the front if women are busy being balled by night and
coping with the results, children everywhere, during each and
every day.  The gun in the hand of every Black man seems also to
mean diaper swinging females following close behind.
That the Black woman’s only dream is to reproduce is a false
myth, as shown by the fact that 70% of the abortions performed
in this country are done on Black and Third World women.  The
economics of this racist society makes it impossible for many of
these women to afford safe abortions, thus illegal, unsafe abor-
tions occur.  The poor woman’s fate is usually injury or death
from having flushed detergents and soaps into herself, or having
tried to sever the uterine wall to cut away the multiplying cells.
These futile abortive attempts have caused a high death rate
among Black and Third World women, so that the Black
brother’s argument against legal, safe abortion is, in itself, geno-
cidal, killing off Black women in the name of the fetus.  A Black
brother told one of my girl friends that “if any woman of his got
pregnant (note that the fault lies solely with the female) and hurt
or killed anything of his inside her, he’d kill her.”  That’s a
brother’s concern for his sister.156
If, increasingly, as limitations, legal or illegal, on the availability of
legal abortions proliferate—perhaps leading to a Supreme Court chal-
lenge if ballot initiatives declaring fetal personhood, like that which re-
cently failed in Mississippi but are still pending in other states, are
successful—with predictable subsequent effects on abortion restrictions at
the state law level, then more women will become desperate enough so
that the alternative to forced reproduction is a late-term abortion which
may or may not be lawful—and which in the latter case puts the life and
health of the mother at risk as well as in both cases inevitably leading to
feticide or infanticide.  If, then, because of the power of organized opposi-
tion and the current flow of public sentiment on the question of legalized
abortion, the state ballot box proves not to be the answer to attempt to
save women from backyard abortionists, as happened in a modest way in
the 1960s, then reform of constitutional law doctrine may be one way to
stop Kermit Gosnell and others like him.  Neither of these alternatives is
likely to be palatable to pro-lifers or pro-choicers, and neither would occur
without a subsequent surge of successor legal developments.  As the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has shown us, other social changes unlikely to
156. Bev Cole, Black Women and the Motherhood Myth, reprinted in GREENHOUSE
& SIEGEL, supra note 107, at 52, 53.
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be feasible in this nation of bisectionalism might also dry up the supply of
patients for butchers like Gosnell.
Finally, many feminists would point to other social changes necessary
to ensure that just as reproduction is not forced, women’s and girls’ partic-
ipation in sexual intercourse is not coerced.  The gap between that posi-
tion and the one held by those who find potentially procreative sex within
a lawful opposite-sex marriage the only morally permissible expression of
sexuality is vast.  It is the stuff of the culture wars over sexuality which,
among other ingrained characteristics of the nation, we have cultivated
over the march of history, sending women, Roe notwithstanding, to backy-
ard abortionists, licensed or unlicensed, or to the practice of self-abortion,
in communities of poverty that many of us thought we had left behind in
another age.
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